



PERCEPTIONS

UNDERSTAND THE IMPACT OF NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND PERCEPTIONS IN COUNTRIES ABROAD ON MIGRATION FLOWS AND THE SECURITY OF THE EU & PROVIDE VALIDATED COUNTER APPROACHES, TOOLS AND PRACTICES

D2.3 Analysis of Policies and Policy Recommendations



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Executive Summary

According to anecdotal evidence, there seems to be a link between technological advances in communication and levels of migration (Szczepanikova & Van Criekinge, 2018). Mobile phones and social media platforms are used by migrants, traffickers, governments and prospective migrants alike to gain access to information about countries of destinations, routes, future perspectives, and provide information on risky journeys and rights.

Assuming perceptions of Europe, which hold contested images of Europe, contribute to a certain extent to decisions to migrate, and in some cases to security threats – what do countries do to address these threats? This report provides an overview of underlying rationales of policies and policy measures addressing security threats that are linked with perceptions of Europe or a particular country. While this report does not assess the impact of the measures analysed, it provides a categorisation of types of measures contributing to a better understanding of the ways in which such policy measures are intended to work. Explicating the mechanisms employed and their assumptions, such analysis contributes to a better understanding of how various policy measures intend to reach their goals.

A systematic literature review on perceptions of Europe and how they are linked with potential security threats, undertaken in the framework of PERCEPTIONS, found that in the relevant migration and security literature, the term “perceptions” as such is rarely employed. Accordingly, the literature review found that “some countries are perceived to be stepping-stones” towards others, and that some migrants have positive/negative perceptions of Europe or have what could be categorised as a “misperception of the EU”¹.

For the present report, policy measures operating at the intersection of managing migration and security were collected in 12 countries, which, together, cover all three categories along the migration journey – countries of origin, of transit and of destination – Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Spain, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. In sum, policy measures, which address a security threat linked with perceptions, were collected in the following policy areas: asylum, irregular migration, migrant integration, return, border management, policies addressing radicalisation, and policies addressing disinformation online.

One notable result is that “perceptions” (migrants have/acquire about Europe or about a particular country) are not directly addressed by policy measures, with one notable exception – information campaigns aimed at, for instance, discouraging irregular migration towards Europe. Rather, policy measures aimed at addressing a security threat, do so by aiming to change a particular migration behaviour. In so doing, the underlying mechanisms of policy measures only assume a link between perceptions and the threat they intend to address.

The analysis undertaken indicates that most policy measures collected fall under one of the following situations/categories:

- 1) measures **addressing particular migration flows and assuming a threat** to be prevented (e.g. policies addressing certain specific types of flows either in terms of number or composition);

¹ PERCEPTIONS D2.2. Secondary analysis of studies, projects and narratives.

- 2) measures **addressing a threat which is directly linked with migration** and the migration industry (e.g. policies addressing trafficking in human beings; migrant smuggling);
- 3) measures **addressing perceptions linked with the decision to migrate/migration behaviour** (campaigns aimed at informing potential migrants about the dangers of irregular migration/illegal border crossing)

Employing two frameworks of analysis – types of regulatory mechanisms, from the regulatory state theory, and the intervention logic from the theory of change – this report found that most mechanisms employed to address threats linked with perceptions fall under one of these categories: “command and control” and “market-based approaches”. In most of the countries under research, threats are being addressed through legal measures (e.g. through decrees/laws changing access of certain categories of migrants to procedures or services). Another often-used measure are dissuasion campaigns aimed at informing people about the dangers of irregular migration. Some campaigns do not only aim to inform prospective migrants about the risks of irregular migration, but offer information on alternatives (such as legal migration and employment opportunities in sending regions and potential countries of destination).

In sum, while this analysis found that addressing “perceptions” is not the final aim of policy measures, the link between “perceptions” and behaviour (particularly regarding the decision to migrate) is often assumed by these measures and not questioned.

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

Term	Description
AUHA	Antwerp University Association
AZR	Central Register of Foreign Nationals in Germany
BAMF	German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BKA	German Federal Criminal Police Office
BNG	National General Database in Belgium
EPPA	Agency for Placement Abroad in Private Establishments in Tunisia
EU	European Union
EUMAGINE	EUMAGINE is a collaborative European research project aimed at investigating the impact of perceptions of human rights and democracy on migration aspirations and decisions.
EU MS	EU Member State
EUTF	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
ILO	International Labor Organisation
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NAP	National Action Plan
NCCPIM	National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration in Egypt
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

1 Introduction

According to anecdotal evidence, there seems to be a link between technological advances in communication and levels of migration (Szczepanikova & Van Criekinge, 2018). Mobile phones and social media platforms are used by migrants, traffickers, governments and prospective migrants alike to gain access to information about countries of destinations, routes, future perspectives, and provide information on risky journeys and rights. Migrants who have arrived in host countries tend to exaggerate their financial gains and favourably portray their lives online; conveying an overly curated image of what life might be like in Europe to prospective migrants. Although this behaviour online is not unique to migrants and some social media networks are designed to promote and reward such behaviour, it remains nonetheless a contributing factor to the creation of perceptions of Europe abroad, and consequently motivating migration decisions.

Assuming perceptions, which hold contested images of Europe, contribute to a certain extent to decisions to migrate, and in some cases to security threats – what do countries do to address these threats? This report provides an overview of underlying rationales of policies and policy measures addressing security threats that are linked with perceptions of Europe or a particular country.

This report will provide an understanding of “perceptions” in the framework of migration-decision making, and the complementary role it plays by elaborating on existing migration decision-making models, namely the “push-pull plus” model and the “aspirations-capabilities” framework. The “securitization of migration” is employed to refer to the context of security threats linked with migration and the states’ responses through policies and policy measures. Using the “regulatory state” as a framework of analysis is therefore fitting in understanding the link and the overlaps between migration policies and security-based policy narratives. Many of the measures addressing the related security threats aim at changing migration behaviour, and are therefore analysed through an intervention logic model in the framework of the theory of change.

The general aim of this report is to provide an overview of types of measures and policy interventions aimed at addressing security threats that are linked with perceptions. Policy measures mentioned are mainly examples, shedding more clarity on the measures’ rationale, identifying security threats from the perspective of policymakers, narratives around migration and security-related policies, and the perceptions they aim to address.

The report is structured as following:

The first section clarifies the methodological approach employed and aims to offer a conceptual framing as a starting point for analysing relevant policies and policy measures.

The second section presents examples of the types of policy measures identified in the 12 countries under study. The clustering of policies into migration policies, security policies and social media and ICT policies provides a structure to our understanding of the migration-security nexus and the relevance of new technologies and social media in addressing threats linked with “perceptions”.

The third section is a discussion of some of the recurrent types of measures identified – along the typology suggested by the “regulatory state” framework – as addressing threats that are linked with perceptions.

2 Methodology

2.1 Background

Migration scholarship and migration policy-making seem to agree that migration is a complex, multi-faceted issue. To capture various types of people's voluntary movements, both in terms of time/space as well as legal jurisdictions, De Haas (2019) describes migration, "in terms of people moving". He goes further and argues that, from the perspective of those moving, "[human mobility] can only be a freedom- and life-enhancing resource or 'capability' if people can make the actual choice to move". In this sense, he "proposed to define human mobility as people's capability (freedom) to choose where to live, with residential human movement (migration) as the associated outcome" (de Haas, 2019). Here the distinction between aspirations and capabilities is instrumental in explaining "perceptions of destination areas" as a working concept and later on in analysing particular types of policies or measures aimed at addressing threats linked with perceptions of destination areas.

"Aspirations" refers to life aspirations and to people's "perceptions of life 'here' and 'there'", which are subjective and influenced by "broader processes of structural change" (de Haas, 2019). Structural forces that shape migration have been explained through the "push-pull" models, which have been critiqued for presenting migration as a single action rather than a process. To overcome this shortcoming, Van Hear, Bakewell and Long (2017) propose a "push-pull plus" model (Van Hear, Bakewell, & Long, Push-pull plus: Reconsidering the drivers of migration, 2017). Building on the work of Richmond (1994) and Van Hear (1997), this model distinguishes between four types of drivers of migration: predisposing drivers, proximate drivers, precipitating drivers and mediating drivers (Richmond, 1994) (Van Hear, New Diaspora: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities, 1997). In short, predisposing drivers contribute to "a context in which migration is more likely" (e.g. disparities between places of origin and destination areas). Proximate drivers have a more direct effect on migration and manifest, for instance, as economic recession in countries of origin or new economic opportunities in regions of destination. Precipitating drivers can be linked with a particular event (e.g. outbreak of a conflict, changes in political regimes) and "trigger departure, as individuals and households make decisions to move or stay put" (Van Hear, Bakewell, & Long, Push-pull plus: Reconsidering the drivers of migration, 2017). Finally, mediating drivers refer to the infrastructure enabling mobility (e.g. quality of transport), including the migration infrastructure comprised by policies and practices in other spheres than migration policies (e.g. trade, education, agriculture etc.), migrant networks or the related factor of what was called a "culture of migration" (Van Hear, Bakewell, & Long, Push-pull plus: Reconsidering the drivers of migration, 2017). In the "push-pull plus" model, the above-mentioned drivers operate in both areas of origin and of destination, along several dimensions with different impacts, "according to gender, age, class, language, ethnicity, religion" etc. Policies and policy measures analysed in this report, while aiming to influence migration behaviour, address some of these factors or how they manifest along these dimensions. For instance, the amendments to the Italian asylum legislations, implemented after the 2015 migration policy crisis, when Italian shores saw a dramatic increase in the arrivals of asylum seekers, aim to restrict access to procedures for asylum seekers already in Italy, but also to send a message for those considering Italy as a potential destination. In this sense, the legal amendments address the migration infrastructure as a precipitating driver in the country of destination, for a particular type of movement (asylum seekers).

Furthermore, the decision to migrate or not (manifested as migration behaviour) is an outcome “of an interplay between these drivers and agency”. To take agency also “means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree” (Sewell, Jr., 1992). Agency in migration behaviour is an important aspect, often assumed by policy measures. This is the case even for measures aimed at addressing a type of movement which is associated with involuntary migration although not always manifested as such – for example trafficking in human beings. Persons that have been trafficked (and identified as such in another country than their country of origin) might have started their migration journey in a regular way (e.g. applying for a job abroad). However, in many cases trafficking begins with a situation of coercion, in which persons coerced do not have a genuine choice. Anti-trafficking information campaigns that aim at informing potential migrants about the dangers of trafficking for labour exploitation assume therefore one main situation in which trafficking occurs, namely regular migration to a destination area (for the purpose of employment), where exploitation and subsequently trafficking occurs.

Aspirations and desires to migrate are influenced, on one side by the interplay of drivers, on the other side by people’s more general life understanding and imaginations of existing life conditions or quality of life in the place they currently are (and corresponding conditions somewhere else). In this sense, aspirations to migrate have a relational characteristic. The project *Imagining Europe from the Outside (EUMAGINE)*, which investigated how people in Morocco, Senegal, Turkey and Ukraine relate to the possibility of migration, found that perceptions of particular dimensions of life in Europe as opposed to life in their countries of origin influence migration aspirations:

“While negative perceptions on healthcare, education, poverty reduction policies and gender relations in their own country support emigration aspirations in general, positive perceptions on life in Europe (including healthcare, education, gender relations and poverty reduction policies) support aspirations to move to Europe”. (EUMAGINE, 2013)

Similarly, in addition to dissatisfaction with local circumstances, other studies underline a negative correlation between life-satisfaction on the one hand, and the wish to emigrate on the other (Migali & Scipioni, 2019).

2.2 Working Concepts

This report aims to offer an overview of the types of policies and policy measures aimed at addressing (security) threats which are linked with perceptions of destination areas (here, perceptions either of Europe or of a particular country). For this overview, relevant are the following concepts and relations between them, for which explanations are subsequently provided in this section:

- 1) Perceptions of destination areas as a determining factor for migration behaviour;
- 2) Aspirations and capabilities (from the “aspirations-capabilities” model) for explaining the working concept of perceptions of destination areas;
- 3) Drivers of migration (from the “push-pull plus” model, including their dimensions) as echelons at which policies/policy measures analysed aim to have an impact in order to influence migration behaviour;
- 4) Agency, which, according to the intervention logic employed for this analysis, is assumed by policy measures aiming to address migration behaviour (by addressing/changing/influencing drivers of migration, particularly precipitating drivers and mediating drivers).

Migration literature which refers to perceptions of an area of destination understood as a “mental image”, links it with narratives, discourses and imaginations, but also with ideas and knowledge and information about a particular aspect of that destination area. Without detailing the meaning and scope of the field of narratology and its associated subject of study – “narrative” (Amerian & Jofi, 2015), and for the purpose of this report, we retain that narratives are “stories with a temporal sequence of events, unfolding a plot that is populated by dramatic moments, symbols and archetypal characters that culminate in a moral to the story” (Jones & McBeth, 2010). In social and communication theory, narratives are “the principal and inescapable mode by which we experience the world” (Baker, 2019). From this perspective, narratives are public and personal “stories” that we subscribe to and that guide our behaviour (Baker, 2019). Following this view, relevant are also policy narratives on migration – strategically constructed “stories” which come in many forms, with an array of stakeholders, speeches, political press releases, news stories etc. and where the political environment is relevant (Bosewell, Geddes, & Scholten, 2011).

Similar to the approach employed in the EUMAGINE project, in this report, aspirations are understood as an intermediate phase between imaginations (understood here as ideas and information) and migration decision-making (manifested as migration behaviour). “One can have images about migration or potential destinations, without really aspiring to leave or to migrate. [...] While imaginations carry the basis for a motivation to migrate, aspirations refer to people’s thoughts about migration as a possible strategy for themselves” (Timmerman, Heyse, & Van Mol, 2010). “The notion of migration aspirations reflects not only socially sanctioned behaviour, but also social mechanisms of diffusion: people may observe the migratory achievements of their peers, come to see migration as a realistic prospect and develop migration aspirations” (Carling & Collins, 2017).

For the purpose of this analysis, “migrants’ perceptions about a destination area” (either of Europe or of a particular country) refers to the ideas and information (in the sense of knowledge²) migrants have about the EU or about a particular country. Unlike the EUMAGINE approach, where the impact of discourses on perceptions considered two types of “imaginations” – the migratory project which refers to the “range of desired and desirable identities and lifestyles through which potential migrants imagine themselves” and the geographical imaginations –, for the purpose of this analysis we will refer to geographical imaginations only. We employ a similar understanding of the concept, according to which “‘geographical imaginations’ refers to the subjectivity of the human conception of locations, spaces, countries and the people inhabiting these physical spaces” (Timmerman, Heyse, & Van Mol, 2010). This approach acknowledges “geographical imaginations” as cultural constructions which are influenced by discourses (be it popular discourses, policy discourses or through social networks). For the purpose of this analysis a broad understanding of the concept of discourse will be employed, namely “representations, practices and performances through which meanings are produced and legitimised” (Timmerman, Heyse, & Van Mol, 2010).

² For the purpose of this analysis, knowledge here is understood as propositional knowledge – which refers to gathering (accurate) information about the world or about a specific situation (e.g. accurate information about the journey to Europe or to a particular country, about the life situation in Europe or a particular country). Information and communication technologies contribute to what has been labelled as “the problem of perceptual knowledge”, since “the way things look isn’t always the way things are; appearances can be deceptive” (Pritchard, 2010: 69). In the epistemology of knowledge this argument subscribes to indirect realism, according to which “there is an objective world out there, one that is independent of our experience of it – that is the ‘realism’ part – but that we can only know this world indirectly through experience” (Idem: 77).

In order to provide an overview of the types of measures addressing security threats which are linked with perceptions of destination areas, additional clarifications of the concept of security threats or risks are required. With reference to what was called “securitisation of migration”, in the early 2010s, Bourbeau (2011) identified several factors that, in his view, “have recently begun to cause alarm”: “1) the notion of migration in a collective sense posing an existential threat to the security of the state and/or the society; 2) the prominence given to immigration as a security threat; and 3) its attendant effects in political practice, which have undergone significant and even startling changes”. For something (or someone) to be a security risk, three criteria must be fulfilled: the threat has to be clearly defined, that which is endangered has to be specified (the referent object of security) and there must be a link between the threat and the referent object³. In the policy measures considered in this report one or more of these elements are only “tacitly expressed, but the link between the threat and the referent object will be underlined through the intervention logic from theory of chance (one of the frameworks for analysis employed in this report).

2.3 Methodological Approach

This report suggests a categorization of policies (including policy measures and policy recommendations) that address threats/security issues, which are linked with migrants’ perceptions of destination areas (either of Europe or of a particular country). In other words, the report analyses governments’ actions (be it at the international, federal, national, regional or local level) addressing (potential) security threats linked with migrants’ perceptions of Europe or of a particular country/region. A systematic literature review on perceptions of Europe and how they are linked with potential security threats, undertaken in the framework of PERCEPTIONS, found that in the relevant migration and security literature, “perceptions” as such are rarely employed. Existing research, including policy analyses, does not employ “perceptions” as a category of practice⁴, but rather, to a limited extent, as a category of analysis (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Accordingly, “some countries are perceived to be stepping-stones” towards others, migrants have positive/negative perceptions of Europe or migrants have what could be categorised as a “misperception of the EU”.⁵

The overall aim of this report is to present types of policies (including policy measures and policy recommendations) aimed at addressing security threats which are linked with perceptions. The

³ PERCEPTIONS D2.4. List of Threats

⁴ Brubaker and Cooper (2000) differentiate between “categories of social and political practice and categories of social and political analysis” (2000: 4). In their view, “category of practice [implies] a relatively sharp distinction between ‘native’ or ‘folk’ or ‘lay’ categories on the one hand and ‘scientific’ categories on the other” (Idem). In other words, categories of practice are those categories used in policy jargon. To take an example, trafficking in human beings is both a category of practice and a category of analysis, as it is being employed in policy documents and legislation, as well as in scientific analyses. On the other hand, the term “modern slavery” is a category of practice as it is employed in policy documents (e.g. in the UK anti-trafficking legislation), but has been contested as a category of analysis for at least two reasons; first, it is an umbrella term which implies, for political reasons, that trafficking in human beings is a continuation of the transatlantic slave trade; second, the term “modern slavery”, unlike trafficking in human beings, has no internationally accepted definition which adds to the difficulties when it comes to its operationalisation. For a historical perspective on this particular distinction, see Norbert Cyrus (2015), *The Concept of Demand in Relation to THB: A review of debates since the late 19th century*. DemandAT Working Paper.

⁵ PERCEPTIONS D2.2. Secondary analysis of studies, projects and narratives.

policies and policy measures retained for analysis had to fulfil two main criteria: they had to address both migration and a security issue. In practical terms, the following steps were considered:

- 1) The aim of a policy included in this collection is to address a threat (either threat to the public, the border or territory of a country or of a region or threat to an individual).
- 2) Furthermore, that threat has to be linked with a migration behaviour (be it referring to the decision to migrate, drivers of migrations influencing migration processes, the consequences of migration, vulnerabilities that result from migration etc.; both legal and irregular migration, as well as voluntary and forced migration were considered).
- 3) Finally, the migration behaviour considered is thought to be linked with perceptions of Europe or of a particular country.

Rather than presenting a collection of all possible policies and types of measures, this report aims to provide for a categorisation of recurring types of such policies and measures.

The current debates on migration in Europe focus on characteristics of mixed migration and of migration policies as of 2015. Taking 2015 as the starting point for collecting relevant policies enabled us to present recent policies and policy measures, but limited the scope of our findings, particularly for types of policies which might not fall under our categorisation.

This analysis does not challenge the link between movement/narrative/perception of a destination area and the threat which is addressed by the policies and policy measures showcased in this paper. The aim is to explicate their underlying mechanisms for achieving their declared/assumed goals. In so doing, the linkages between migration behaviour, narratives/perceptions influencing this behaviour on the one hand and the security threats on the other is being presented. In this sense, the analysis offered is descriptive and not normative, as it sets a starting analytical point for the upcoming field work in the countries/regions under study in the PERCEPTIONS project.

Policies which have been in place or implemented as of 2015 in countries under study were collected by PERCEPTIONS partners, all with long-standing experience in conducting social science research⁶. Countries under research are both EU MS and partner countries and together cover all three categories along the migration journey – countries of origin, of transit and of destination – Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Spain, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. Data collection was carried out in the following languages: Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, English, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian and Spanish.

For each entry, the following was collected:

- 1) Level of the Organisation/Institution releasing the policy document (EU-, federal-, national-, regional- and local-level);

⁶ Data on Algeria was primarily collected by PERCEPTIONS partners from the Euro-Arab Foundation for Higher Studies (FUNDEA) and the Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD); Belgium: University of Antwerp (UANTWERPEN); Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD); Egypt: Egyptian Center for Innovation and Technology Development (ECITD); Germany: Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR); Greece and Cyprus: Kentro Meleton Asfaleias – Center for Security Studies (KEMEA); Italy: Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna (UNIBO); Kosovo: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS); Spain: University Rey Juan Carlos (URJC); Tunisia: University of Granada (UGR) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD); United Kingdom: Sheffield Hallam University (CENTRIC) and Swansea University (SU).

- 2) Type of policy (National Strategy, National Action Plan (NAP), White Paper, recommendations by non-governmental actors, including legislation etc.);
- 3) Year in which the policy was released and years in which the policy was implemented;
- 4) Organisation/Institution issuing the policy and organisation/institution(s) implementing the policy;
- 5) Background of the policy document (why the policy was initiated, who supported the policy, what was the initial goal of the policy, if available);
- 6) Explanation of the link with perceptions or particular narratives (whether it is about preventing counter-narratives, repairing damage resulting from (mis)perception, or aimed at improving social cohesion, countering security threats etc.);
- 7) Final declared goal of the policy (e.g. social cohesion, countering security threats etc.);
- 8) Main approach (what types of action is suggested - e.g. command and control, peer pressure, by design, combined approaches etc. - intervention logic);
- 9) Monitoring and evaluation measures foreseen in the policy document (e.g. Action Plan, Implementation Plan);
- 10) Results of concluded monitoring and evaluations (has it been evaluated as successful? if yes, with what results?).

Policy documents collected subscribed to the following areas: policies in the areas of asylum, policies addressing irregular migration, policies addressing trafficking in human beings, policies addressing border control, migrant integration policies, return policies, policies addressing terrorism and radicalisation, as well as policies addressing disinformation online. The following types of sources were consulted: official documents elaborated by public administrations at national-, regional- or local-level (including strategies, action plans, legislations, official communication etc.), reports by non-governmental organisations and international organisations (including those formulating recommendations for policy-makers in the area of migration and security), public campaigns (such as information campaigns aimed at discouraging irregular migration).

In total, 230 data sources were collected, out of which 126 were retained for analysis. The exclusion criteria included: lack of information provided for a data entry (and for which no relevant additional information – available online – was identified), outdated data entry (long before 2015), data entry for a policy which does not address a threat linked with migration.

In order to understand how policies/policy measures retained for this analysis aim to address threats that are linked with perceptions (of destination areas), two frameworks of analysis are employed – the regulatory state and the intervention logic (as an integral part of the theory of change). The next section briefly introduces these two frameworks.

2.4 Framework of Analysis

Aiming to explain the underlying mechanisms of policies (including policy measures and policy recommendations) identified, this report employs two frameworks – a typology of regulatory measures put forward by the literature on the regulatory state and the intervention logic as explained by the theory of change.

2.4.1 The Regulatory State

The framework of the “Regulatory State” looks at how the state tries to regulate human behaviour using different types of measures. “Command and control” is a traditional tool to regulate,

characterised by the use of coercion (Moran, 2002). In practice, this translates into an authority (the state) imposing those being regulated to comply with certain rules. Usually, the rule has attached to it a particular sanction, which has at least two main purposes – to correct noncompliance and to deter potential refusal to comply. The classic example of a command and control type of measure is the penal code. Crimes defined in the penal code have attached a sanction, which is aimed at both, punishing those who committed the crime and discouraging those who might commit the crime in the future.

Alternative forms of regulating can be clustered in three main groups: market-based mechanisms, community-based (peer-pressure), and design (Boswell & Kyambi, 2016). “Market-based mechanisms” aim to steer human behaviour through taxes and subsidies, incentivising social actors to comply with a particular regulation. For instance, in particular employment sectors, companies who employ persons with disabilities might be exempt from some taxes.

“Peer-pressure” regulation uses the power of communities – if a sufficiently large number of social actors agree to act in a particular way, those who do not comply will be “named and shamed” and therefore pressured into compliance. This is, for example, done through showcasing the employee of the month in a company (in this case “name and fame” those who complied with certain rules) or naming and shaming, though public media communication for instance, apparel companies who employ exploitative practices in their supply chains.

Finally, “design” is a more subtle way of steering behaviour – it refers to an infrastructure put in place in a particular policy area, which, by design, determines a particular behaviour. Thaler and Sunstein (2008), based on research in behavioural psychology and economics, suggest that social environments can be designed in order to induce particular social behaviours (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This is the case, for instance, of organ donor systems in which donors have to opt out rather than opt in and where the rate of organ donations is higher than in the systems where donors have to opt in.

It is worth mentioning that these types of measures are ideal types and each of them functions in existing dynamic regulation environments. Furthermore, as the discussion chapter of this report will showcase, these regulatory mechanisms often operate in combination and not individually.

Public institutions’ governing mechanisms have been described by various frameworks – such as governance or what was called multilevel governance. However, considering the purpose of this report, the typology of policy measures put forward by the regulatory state, coupled with the intervention logic from the theory of change (introduced briefly in the following sub-section) offers clarity with regard to the underlying mechanisms of particular measures. This, in turn, offers a starting point for better understanding the role “perceptions of destination areas” might play in the formulation of migration policy measures in these destination areas.

2.4.2 Intervention Logic from the Theory of Change

A common understanding of a Theory of Change in the literature on evaluation defines it as “the hypothesis about the way that a program brings about its effects” (Dhillon & Vaca, 2018). “A Theory of Change is an organisation’s hypothesis of the changes that will occur as it is utilising its strategies and activities to achieve its mission” (Dhillon & Vaca, 2018). Theories of change are used in evaluation studies to assess the impact of a measure. “The intervention logic follows the assumed causal chain of the intended effects of one single [measure]. It is part of a theory of change, which [...] considers the interaction of the intervention logics of more than one activity pursued in one project. [...] Ideally, a

theory of change is derived from problem analysis” (Cyrus & Vogel, Learning from Demand-Side Campaigns against Trafficking in Human Beings: Evaluation as Knowledge-Generator and Project Improver, 2017). Similar to the approach of Cyrus and Vogel (2017), this report does “not analyse a problem and construct a theory of change to recommend interventions; instead [it analyses policies and policy measures] in order to reconstruct the underlying intervention logic”.

For the task at hand – to categorise policy measures aimed at addressing threats linked with perceptions – the intervention logic presents itself as a useful tool. By explicating the mechanism of a policy measure, for instance the measure implemented in Belgium for fast tracking asylum applications after 2016 – when a government’s analysis of migration influx in Belgium revealed that the country is facing an excessive number of multiple asylum applications (under different assumed names) – intended and unintended results can be looked into. Although assessing the effects of the measures identified falls beyond the scope of this report, analysing their underlying mechanisms offers a starting point for understating the kind of impact these measures might have.

2.5 Reflection on the Framework of Analysis and the Working Concepts

With regard to the analysis undertaken in this report, some clarification on the general approach is useful. This report makes use of concepts and refers to migration (either as a field of research or as a policy area) from at least two registries of knowledge on migration. First, for conceptual clarity, the report refers to recent migration scholarship, which aims at better understanding migration. It refers to results of what was called “a theoretical mission to better understand the forces and frictions through which migration comes about and is experienced” (Carling and Collins, 2017: 909). This first registry refers to migration theory from which the working concepts of this report will draw, particularly for explaining the understanding of “perceptions of destination areas”.

Second, the report describes the underlying logic of policy measures aimed to address threats that are linked with migration behaviour.

The difference between the two registries is that, while the first attempts to achieve clarity with regard to understanding migration as a phenomenon, the second attempts to reach a specific goal (e.g. attract highly-skilled, deter irregular migration etc.). While these two registries inform each other and contribute to what was referred as the “reflexive-dynamics of knowledge transfer”⁷ and contribute to the co-production of knowledge in the area of migration, it is worth noting the two registries’ different goals. This analysis is situated somewhere in-between, as it draws on concepts from migration theory, particularly on the recent work of Carling and Collins (2017), De Haas (2019) and Van Hear, Bakewell and Long (2017) and aims to contribute to a better understanding of particular migration policy measures, contributing to the further goal of the PERCEPTIONS project, i.e. to support migration policy-makers and practitioners in their daily work (Carling & Collins, 2017) (de Haas, 2019) (Van Hear, Bakewell, & Long, Push-pull plus: Reconsidering the drivers of migration, 2017)⁸.

To sum up, for the purpose of this analysis, “perceptions” refers to ideas and information, which migrants have/acquire about Europe or about various countries under study – either as (potential) countries of destination or countries of transit. While the EUMAGINE project conceptualises Europe in

⁷ The concept was elaborated in a series of workshops on the challenges of commissioned research co-organized by one of the authors of this report in 2015 and 2016 in the framework of the Annual IMISCOE Conference.

⁸ See the overall aim of PERCEPTIONS.

terms of democracy and human rights, the method employed in this report takes an exploratory view on Europe and/or a particular country as destination areas. In this sense, the ideas and information that migrants have with regard to life in Europe/in countries under research can refer to a variety of aspects, such as: healthcare, education, housing, labour market, level of public security, social security or standards of living in general.

By looking into the types of policies and policy measures aimed at addressing threats, which are linked with perceptions, the report contributes to addressing a series of additional questions. How can one explain/understand the connections between threats (as identified by policies and policy measures) and perceptions (of Europe/of a particular transit or destination country) that are linked with migration behaviour (an expression of human mobility)? Do policies addressing threats aim/claim to address external structural elements shaping the decision space for those considering migration? Although this report does not provide definitive answers to any of these questions, the analysis undertaken seems to indicate that most policy measures collected fall under one of the following situations/categories:

- 1) Measures addressing particular migration flows and assuming a threat to be prevented (e.g. policies addressing certain specific types of flows either in terms of number or composition, such as countries receiving a disproportionate number of asylum applications);
- 2) Measures addressing a threat which is directly linked with migration and the migration industry (e.g. policies addressing trafficking in human beings or migrant smuggling);
- 3) Measures addressing perceptions linked with the decision to migrate/migration behaviour (campaigns aimed at informing potential migrants about the dangers of irregular migration/illegal border crossing).

The next chapter summarises the measures identified in countries under research and retained for analysis. The link between perceptions of destination areas, as understood in this report, and migration behaviour will be further explained in the discussion chapter of this report.

3 Analysis of Policies and Policy Recommendations

The following chapter gives an overview of the types of policies identified in the countries under study. The clustering of policies into migration policies, security policies and social media and ICT policies provides examples of policy measures under the migration-security nexus and the relevance of new technologies and social media in addressing threats linked with “perceptions”.

Migration policies aim to regulate particular aspects of the migration journey, migrants’ status and stay in countries of transit and destination. With the ever-rising securitization of migration following the 2015 migration policy crisis, migration policies have increasingly expanded in scope, reflecting security concerns stemming from migration movements, and more directly addressing arising threats, both potential and current (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). Security policies are not specific to migrant populations but have increasingly addressed security threats linked with migration movements, or threats that tend to affect disproportionately individuals with migration backgrounds. Finally, we look at technology and social media policies to investigate the extent to which policies take into account the role of emerging technologies and social media in informing decisions to migrate and mitigate security threats linked to the use or misuse of technologies. Since the evidence on technology-driven migration and security threats in relation to perceptions is rather limited and, for the time being anecdotal, this report will look more broadly at policies addressing misinformation, policies governing the use of social media and new technologies, and the role of information campaigns, particularly in relation to social media, in addressing security threats linked with migration behaviour.

Although these clusters aim at providing a structured overview of the types of policies, policy measures and recommendations addressing security threats linked with perceptions, there is a clear overlap between some subcategories within these clusters, particularly in the area of human trafficking, seen both from a migration lens as well as a security one.

The policies outlined in the following sections are not meant to provide an exhaustive overview of all existing policies in the countries under study but rather display examples of measures in these contexts, highlighting the threats identified by various policies, and the types of measures taken to counter them.

3.1 Migration Policies

The following section gives an overview of migration policies aimed at countering security threats arising from what is considered as misperceptions⁹ and which are linked with migration. These misperceptions are explored from a policy-making perspective, framed in a context of a threat, both potential and current, along with the policy measures to counter them. Potential and manifested threats are intertwined with different narratives, which in turn, refer, to various extents, to a perception of Europe that is seen as problematic from a security perspective. This section will not evaluate these perceptions or threats but rather aims to understand the link between all these elements from a policy-making standpoint. More specifically, this section will provide a typology of

⁹ Based on the PERCEPTIONS Glossary developed in WP8, misperception is referred to as “a false or inaccurate perception (Merriam-Webster dictionary). As assessing when a perception is inaccurate is tricky, when we talk of misperception, it is always a misperception according to a specific subject or group of people.

policies targeting asylum from 2015 onwards, as well as policies addressing irregular migration, border control, return, integration, and human trafficking.

3.1.1 Policies in the Area of Asylum

Following the 2015 migration policy crisis, and the subsequent changes witnessed in Europe and its neighbouring countries, the need to reconsider migration policies became a priority for many governments and institutions. Many reforms addressed in this chapter were also motivated by pre-existing and newly arising threats, whether potential or current, as well as migrants' perceptions of countries of asylum. Policy documents analysed in this section echo some of the threats outlined by different European as well as non-European governments.

Terms such as “disproportionate” numbers of asylum seekers highlight the underlying assumption of governments that large influx of migrants represent a threat to countries' stability and capacity to host asylum seekers. Policy documents also referred to addressing “abusive” practices by asylum seekers who do not have a legitimate protection claim, practices which have been labelled as representing a threat to governments' resources, taking away from the public budget and from other, legitimate, asylum seekers. Beyond addressing the economic threats created by the strain on resources and public budgets, and what was seen as “false” claims submitted by asylum seekers, threats undermining a country's sovereignty have also been highlighted in several policy documents, both in EU and non-EU countries.

In order to counter these threats, several countries introduced measures aimed at lowering the costs of processing asylum claims. Countries introduced measures aimed at speeding the processing of claims, countering the abusive practices of some asylum seekers to lengthen the processing time, and by extension their individual benefits received during the waiting phase. States also supported the Reform of the Dublin Mechanism, which would lower the number of asylum claims introduced through secondary movements.

In Belgium, the Policy Note from the State Secretary of Asylum and Migration for 2017-2018 revealed that in 2016, an excessive number of multiple asylum applications, sometimes under different aliases, were submitted (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2017). This was largely seen as undermining the state, leading to high administrative costs and longer processing times of the initial asylum claims, as well as postponing the return of rejected asylum seekers. The Policy Note underlined that asylum seekers who abusively submit multiple asylum claims do not aim to secure international protection, but are, for the most part, “false” asylum seekers whose goal is to extend their right to stay and work, and therefore to obtain a temporary residence permit to protect them from expulsion, while awaiting an asylum decision. To counter this abuse, the Policy Note advised for a faster procedure to shorten the right to stay associated with multiple asylum claims submitted, which will in turn lower the incentive and by extension the recourse to submitting multiple asylum claims. In some cases, rejected asylum seekers used to resubmit their asylum claim in another language, which is referred to as “linguistic shopping”. This approach was used in the hope that applications might be successful if presented in another language or that disqualifying factors from earlier asylum applications will be overlooked. This approach is no longer allowed under the Belgian Asylum Law. These measures were created to counter the economic and symbolic threats to the asylum system by introducing stricter measures, limiting incentives and, by extension, changing asylum seekers' behaviours.

A similar approach was introduced in Germany to counter the introduction of “false” claims of asylum and international protection and the costs associated with processing those claims (Hänsel, Hess, &

Kasperek, 2019). In October 2015, the Act to Accelerate Asylum Procedures was introduced, opening the way for a new categorisation of asylum applications, which distinguishes between applications with a high probability of being recognised as in need of international protection or refugee status and others as less or not likely to be recognised. The nationality of the applicant was the basis for this categorization, which then informs subsequent decisions in the asylum process such as accommodation, access to integration courses, and obtaining a work permit. More specifically, the Act allowed to speed up asylum procedures, ensured the accommodation of both asylum seekers awaiting a decision and refugees, simplified the enforceable return of rejected asylum seekers with the objective of reducing the so-called “false incentives” of unjustified asylum claims, as well as improved the integration outcomes of those with a higher likelihood of being accepted and remaining in Germany (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasperek, 2019). The Act also aimed at reducing the incentive of unjustified applications by replacing cash benefits with in-kind benefits during the initial reception phase, reducing the benefits for those who have to leave the country, and excluding from the labour market those asylum seekers originating from countries considered safe. In return, integration measures supported those with “good chances of remaining” with integration courses, job-related language support, measures actively promoting employment and temporarily lifting the exclusion from the German labour market. This coupled approach, favouring specific groups of asylum seekers by providing incentives for integration and creating financial disincentives for groups seen as posing threats to the asylum system (such as limiting benefits and access to the labour market), shows the aim to modify behaviours of both current and potential asylum seekers, through signalling and implementing stricter regulations.

In predominantly transit countries at the external border of the EU such as Greece and Cyprus, the threat of disproportionate influx of asylum seekers and the strain it poses on public budgets and government resources led to a different approach, known as the creation of hotspots and the involvement of law enforcement in asylum procedures. Following the EU-Turkey Statement¹⁰, “hotspots” on the Greek Aegean islands were transformed from screening centres to detention facilities, and Greece transitioned from a country of transit to a country of destination (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019). To accommodate the changes witnessed, Greece concluded reforms to its Asylum Police, which established an Asylum Service to assess international protection claims, as well as an Appeals Committee and a First Reception Service. Registration with the Hellenic Police on arrival became a necessary step to be able to submit an asylum application.

In addition, a hotspot approach was introduced by the European Commission to support frontline member states, amongst which Greece, to alleviate the pressure and provide operational assistance to identify, register, fingerprint, and debrief newly arriving migrants and asylum seekers, as well as support return operations. Following the EU-Turkey Statement, the fast track border procedure was implemented targeting asylum seekers arriving after 20 March 2016. This procedure transformed the hotspots into closed detention centres. The registration of asylum applications and the notification of decisions is conducted by staff from the Hellenic Police or the Armed forces, with the aim of concluding the asylum procedure within a 2-week time frame.

¹⁰ On 18 March 2016, EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed on the EU-Turkey Statement to end irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU, ensure improved reception conditions for refugees in Turkey and open up organised, safe and legal channels to Europe for Syrian refugees. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-on_en.pdf

As of March 1st, 2020, the Government of Greece decided to suspend all new asylum applications introduced (BBC News, 2020). The decision was justified with the extraordinary circumstances and the necessity to confront what is referred to as an “asymmetric threat to the national security”, which prevails over the application of EU law and international law regarding asylum procedures. The announcement also referred to a lack of capacity to process, within a reasonable period of time, asylum applications that would be submitted during the “illegal mass entry into the country”. Consequently, all asylum applications by individuals “entering the country illegally will be suspended” and individuals will be returned, without registration to the country of departure or their country of origin.

This framing of asylum seekers as irregular migrants, and subsequently applying a different set of measures is similar to the approach used in non-European countries, including Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. In Tunisia, the 2014 Constitution provides for the right to seek asylum (Badalic, 2019). However, the country does not have an asylum law. The issue of asylum seekers protection is a low priority for Tunisian policy makers, given other political challenges. Asylum seekers arriving to Tunisia irregularly are treated as irregular migrants, meaning criminal offenders, and are kept in detention and unable to reach the UNHCR to submit their asylum claim. There have been several reports of authorities deploying a strategy to stop irregular migrants from attempting to make asylum claims. Detention and “push-backs”¹¹ at the borders are common practices, not only in Tunisia, but in other North African countries (Badalic, 2019).

3.1.2 Policies Addressing Irregular Migration

Policies addressing irregular migration are particularly relevant to understanding how policymakers address irregular movements, which threats they identify as resulting from migrants (irregularly) leaving their countries of origin and aspiring to arrive to particular countries of destination, and which aspects of migrants’ perceptions they identify as key in countering these threats. Policymakers’ response varies amongst countries of origin, transit and destination, with countries of origin and transit such as Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt largely following what is referred to as a “cimmigration approach”¹², criminalizing irregular migrants, including asylum seekers. European countries with an external EU border such as Bulgaria, Italy and Greece, have strengthened their preventive measures through fencing policies, increased border capacities in coordination with Frontex, and promoted awareness campaigns deterring migrants from undertaking dangerous journeys to reach Europe. Countries considered to be predominantly of destination have also undertaken similar measures, in addition to implementing changes in laws and regulations facilitating the repatriation of irregularly staying migrants, in particular those detained for crimes committed in European countries.

The repatriation of illegally staying criminals is outlined as an important priority for many European governments. In Belgium, convicted criminals who are irregularly staying are on the deportation priority list and their removal is executed more efficiently, as a result of a stronger involvement of the Ministry of Justice. This led to an increase in the number of convicted criminals’ deportations from 625

¹¹ There are accounts of migrants who are often taken back to the border regions of the original crossing point, including desert areas, and left to their own device.

¹² Based on the PERCEPTIONS Glossary developed in WP8, the cimmigration approach refers to a policy approach that criminalises irregular migrants, including asylum seekers. In some countries of origin and transit, it can refer to legal or illegal attempts to push migrants outside their territories.

in 2014 to 1622 in 2017, with a total of over 6,000 convicted criminals being deported over the last few years (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018).

In Bulgaria, a country of first entry to the EU and bordering the Schengen area, irregular migration flows include both new inflows as well as returns from other EU Member States. In reaction to the sharp increase of illegal border crossings in 2015, the return responses in countries further on the route (from Austria to Hungary, from Hungary to Serbia, from Serbia to Bulgaria) and the observed increasing smuggling activities supporting large groups of migrants crossing into the country, Bulgaria significantly increased its fencing policy by building up fences almost on the entire land border, with second and third lines of control at the green borders (Stoynova, Bezlov, Yttri Dahl, & Fischer Bjelland, 2017). In addition, the border police were reinforced with gendarmerie units, with the national army and seconded border guards from Frontex. The share of irregular migrants apprehended at the border and who were not registered into the Automated Fingerprint Identification System, when exiting Bulgaria, dropped from over 70% in the first half of 2015 to less than 45% in the first half of 2016. At the same time however, the first months of the 2015 migration policy crisis lead to increased smuggling activities at the Bulgarian southern borders of new criminal networks alongside the already established migrant smuggling networks. In addition to the General Directorate for Border Police, other law enforcement institutions got involved in fighting migrant smuggling and smugglers as articles 280 and 281 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code stipulate penalties and fines for smugglers, with a list of aggravating circumstances, and confiscation of vehicles (Stoynova, Bezlov, Yttri Dahl, & Fischer Bjelland, 2017).

Algeria and Tunisia are both countries of origin and transit of irregular migrants. Several international legal instruments address the right to leave one's country, a freedom that can be subjected to restrictions when necessary to protect national security, the public order or morals, public health, and the rights and freedoms of others. Both Algeria and Tunisia punish the exit from the country through irregular means.

Overtime, Algeria has become a country of settlement for migrants who initially intended to transit the country. This is particularly the case of large numbers of sub-Saharan African migrants irregularly residing in Algeria, specifically in border regions. There they have allegedly been committing serious crimes that threaten the safety and security of citizens and the national economy. To this effect, Algeria has put in place legal, structural, and security measures as well as economic measures to counter irregular migration (Yousfat & Bentayebi, 2019). The legal and structural measures emphasise the importance of enhancing the control over the migration flows heading towards its territory. The legal framework of this measure is the 2008 law regulating the conditions of entry, residence and movement of migrants in the country by expanding the scope of powers vested in the relevant authorities in charge of controlling the situation of foreigners and limiting the length of the visas issued. This is done, in addition to deportation, through expulsion or pushbacks to the borders, as well as criminal sentences including fines and imprisonment. Algeria not only criminalises any Algerian but also any foreign national who leaves the Algerian territory irregularly, using fraudulent identification documents, or any other deceiving means and withholding the use of official documents or not going through the adequate process. The punishment is either two to six months of imprisonment or a fine ranging from 20,000 to 60,000 Algerian dinars (the equivalent of 150 to 450 EUR) (Yousfat & Bentayebi, 2019).

In addition, the General Directorate for National Security in Algeria established the Central Office to combat irregular migration, which is the central body coordinating between different regional entities tasked with conducting investigations. The Algerian authorities have also put in place a regional team

for the investigation of irregular migration, which was tasked to research, identify and follow irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks. Since the unrest witnessed by Tunisia and Libya over the last few years, Algeria became a country of transit and destination for migrants entering illegally (Ben Yahia, 2018). The European approach of securitising the borders and the comparatively stable economic situation of the country led Algeria to become a destination for migrants originally aiming to reach European shores (Ben Yahia, 2018). To counter this, the Algerian Government took steps to increase the monitoring of its borders and crossing points, and counter the employment of foreigners using fraudulent documents or involved in marriages of convenience. In addition, the state has banned hosting irregular migrants, or transporting them internally between governorates, all of which is reinforced through harsh punishments. The Algerian law regulating the movements of migrants to and from Algeria aims at addressing, among others, “the influx of large waves of irregular migrants through the Southern borders, and the consequences of these movements such as the increase of organised crime, terrorism, deadly diseases, and informal economic activities” (Ben Yahia, 2018).

Tunisia’s current migration policy is also focused on preventing irregular migration. Since 1998, Tunisia was among the first countries, along with Morocco, to sign a readmission agreement with Italy. The promotion of legal pathways to migration has also been among the priorities promoted by various North African governments before and after the Arab Spring, contrasting with policies criminalising irregular migration (Pouessel, 2014). Despite being unconstitutional (Article 24 of the 2014 constitution provides that every citizen has the right to leave the country), under the current legislation, Tunisian citizens who try to irregularly exit the country shall be punished through detention and the payment of a fine. If Tunisians do exit the country irregularly, they shall be punished upon return, with a 15-day to 6-month prison sentence and a fine of 30 to 120 Tunisian Dinars (Between 11 and 46 EUR) (Pouessel, 2014). Although the law is still in force, its implementation has changed since the 2011 uprisings. Before 2011, more Tunisian citizens were held in detention centres after being arrested for irregularly migrating from the country, while those arrested after 2011 were mostly released after paying a fine (Badalic, 2019).

In Tunisia, since 1968, there is another law that criminalises migration activities and further enlarges the scope of the so called “cimmigration approach”. Under this law, individuals who directly or indirectly help or attempt to facilitate the entry, exit, or stay of irregular migrants into the country face a 1-month to 1-year prison sentence and a fine between 6 and 120 dinars (2.3 to 46 EUR). This law applies equally to migrant smugglers and volunteers providing aid to irregular migrants. A 2004 law introduced tougher sanctions on the activities mentioned by the previous law, with a prison sentence of 4 years and a fine of 10,000 Tunisian Dinars (about 3,800 EUR), to anyone sheltering or providing support or transportation or any other type of help to irregular migrants. The law also criminalises the non-denouncement of irregular migrants and individuals helping them by sentencing those who, “even covered by the obligation of professional secrecy fail to immediately report” any activities involving irregular migrants, with a 3-month prison sentence and a fine of 500 Tunisian Dinars (about 190 EUR) (Pouessel, 2014).

From a European perspective, Tunisia is a key partner in creating a pre-frontier buffer zone against irregular migration from Tunisian citizens seeking better lives in Europe as well as migrants from other African countries trying to reach Europe (Pouessel, 2014). The EU has for long encouraged cooperation with Frontex in the area of collection and sharing of intelligence on migration flows from Tunisia to the EU. In 2013, a program entitled Seahorse Mediterranean Network was created with the aim of establishing a communication network between North African countries (including Egypt, Tunisia, and

Algeria) and EU countries for the exchange of information on irregular migration. Although Tunisia had been part of the network since its inception, significant pressure had to be created by the EU to convince the government to actively participate in the program (Pouessel, 2014).

The alignment of the visions of the EU and Tunisia stems from both parties perceiving irregular migration as a potential security threat, or in some cases a terrorist threat (Pouessel, 2014). The fight against irregular migration has been justified through two EU narratives, one referring to the security risk and potential terrorist threat that irregular migrants pose and the other about associating the fight against irregular migration as a proxy for dismantling organised criminal groups involved in migrant smuggling and trafficking. These two narratives were shared by both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tunisian governments (Pouessel, 2014). New security threats resulting from the escalation of the war in Libya shifted the narratives of irregular migration movements to a focus on the “infiltration of terrorist groups through Libya” (Wehrey, 2020).

Yet another approach towards dealing with preventing and combating irregular migration to be highlighted here are campaigns like the Italian “Aware Migrants”¹³ campaign, which was launched in July of 2016 by the Italian government in collaboration with IOM. The declared purpose of the campaign is to reduce the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and it is directed at potential young migrants in various countries in West and North Africa. “Aware Migrants” aims to increase awareness among potential migrants focusing on the dangerousness of the irregular journey to reach Europe through the desert and the Mediterranean Sea. The descriptions of the risks, the story of the losses, of the violence suffered in the journey, of the disillusionment of expectations once they reach Europe, are told by migrants who managed to reach Italy. The campaign has been implemented using different communication channels, in particular a website, a Facebook page, a Twitter account, Instagram and YouTube page. The website is available in three languages: English, French and Arabic and includes mainly four sections: “stories”, “news”, “media” and “alternatives”. In the first section, there are video-stories, where migrants tell their experiences, highlighting the difficulties and abuses suffered. In the other sections there are: general news on migrations to Europe, alternative information channels through media, a list of opportunities in several African countries for the purpose of promoting valid alternatives to irregular migration in the country of origin and, finally, an information page about the appropriate procedures to legally enter selected European countries.

3.1.3 Border Management Policies

Border management policies vary greatly depending on the geographic position of countries and the (perceived) threats to the physical borders. In order to understand border management policies, it is important to understand which functions, both symbolic and physical, borders are meant to fulfil. Anderson (1996) analyses borders as both an institution and a process. Borders as institutions are meant to represent the scope of state sovereignty and rights of citizens. Borders as a process, represent an instrument of state policy but also of national identity (Anderson, 1997). Traditionally linked with the management and countering of irregular movements, new threats have been identified by policymakers, including: the legal movements, within the EU, of migrants with a criminal background; the use of novel technologies such as drones and satellite maps by migrant smugglers; the constant shift of migrant routes towards Europe; the undetected movements of individuals across the Schengen area; and the limited capacities and resources of third countries with regard to border

¹³ <https://awaremigrants.org/>

management. Unlike previously mentioned policies, border control policies require more cooperation across states and measures undertaken are often implemented in collaboration with a wide variety of state institutions.

The security threats within the EU has seen a change in bordering practices, where individual EU countries imposed new restrictions and checks to ensure the safety of their territories. In the context of European cooperation, many countries have been partaking in the “Eurescrim” project aimed at countering the movement of third country nationals holding residence permits issued by other European countries and who have been convicted in offenses against public safety. Since the project was launched, in 2014, 134 individuals in Belgium have seen their residence permits (issued by another member state) terminated, which allowed Belgium to detain them in order to be deported to their countries of origin (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018).

Another initiative is the operation “Medusa”, initiated in 2016, with the goal of reinforcing the control of groups crossing in large numbers the Belgian border to reach the UK. The operation allowed to better identify these individuals and falls under a larger programme for combating human trafficking, human smuggling and irregular migration to the UK. This initiative was undertaken in collaboration with the Royal Belgian Federation Carriers and logistical services providers (Febetra), the Public Federal Service of Interior Affairs (SPF Intérieur) and the Belgian Federal Police. As part of this initiative, the Office of Foreigners organised an information campaign targeting lorry drivers to draw their attention to the phenomenon of people illegally embarking in their lorries.

In Germany, similar measures reinforcing border control were taken. The German executive policing powers fall under the states’ authorities, with the exception of the federal Border Guard now called Federal Police. With the large scale of arrival of asylum seekers in 2015 and the ongoing debates about reinstating internal border controls (within the EU), Germany has decided to carry out internal border checks. This new migration control has been carried out since then, justified under the relevant articles of the Schengen Borders Code, initially citing Article 25 (a threat to public policy and internal security) then Article 29 (exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the area without internal border controls at risk) (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasperek, 2019). The extension of these measures well after the peak of the 2015 migration policy crisis reflects an understanding of potential threats as a constant, and calls for maintaining border controls with another EU state to counter what is seen as continuously “exceptional circumstances”.

Border control is framed as an essential element of an integrated migration management strategy. Border control, particularly to EU external borders, translates into cooperation with third countries as well as securitizing the EU borders. The process of working closely with third countries has been described as long, challenging and only evolving in small steps. As part of the Externalisation Strategy, Germany has introduced various measures, including the provision of resources to specific third countries around the EU, amongst which Tunisia and Egypt. This support includes police capacity building and training, assistance in security sector reforms, counterterrorism, border management, and the provision of police, border security and military forces equipment (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasperek, 2019).

To address irregular migration, Algeria has implemented a legal and security-focused approach, following the example of other countries. The increased border control was done through increasing the deployment of human resources and the enhancement of physical means to control the border, surrounding the territory and protecting it from any illegal crossings whether to enter or exit the

territory. Forces of the border police have been deployed at all border-crossing points (Yousfat & Bentayebi, 2019).

To facilitate controls across the borders, the Algerian state emphasised the importance of creating biometric visas with neighbouring countries, particularly African countries. These visas would enable those working in border control centres to easily recognise individuals holding legal identification documents and would become a deterrent to those using fraudulent documents. This measure would also aim at introducing computerised procedures to track the entries and exits of any foreigner and to account for those residing illegally, in coordination with the local civil authorities across the country. In addition, the capacities of the coast guards were reinforced and the number of coast guard patrols has doubled. The technology used to guard the coast was also modernised and aerial monitoring was used to trace population movements on land and at sea (Yousfat & Bentayebi, 2019). The increased use and reliance on surveillance technologies as well as the establishment of cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries adds to the efforts made by the Algerian state to increase its security capacities and is intended as a deterrent for prospective irregular migrants and migrant smugglers.

Egypt adopted an “anti-human smuggling law” in 2016 and signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2017. This led to an increase in border controls along the Egyptian shores, in the framework of a program titled “Enhancing the Response to Migration Challenges in Egypt” funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) (Al-Kashef & Martin, 2019). The terms of agreement between the EU and Egypt transcended, the cooperation seen with other countries (in the framework of externalisation strategies) and the conditionality attached to border management and return. Egypt’s border management capacities have been significantly upgraded, including training of officials on border management and funding the National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM). This upgrade has also included support to the counter-terrorism policy, and the establishment of cooperation between Frontex and Egyptian authorities with the exchange of intelligence (Al-Kashef & Martin, 2019).

These agreements have been instrumental in strengthening third countries’ capacities at managing their borders but have also impacted migrants’ behaviour and smuggling networks’ modus operandi. The technological lag, the introduction of new identification and travel documents, and the guarding of new crossing points, in combination with stricter sentences for those who do not comply have aimed at deterring irregular migrants through a command and control approach.

3.1.4 Integration Policies

Integration policies are thought to contribute to prospective migrants’ perceptions of destination countries. Investigating integration policies provides an important input in not only understanding their signalling role to migrants, but also a better understanding of how policymakers conceive of what makes a successful integration and which threats hamper this process and may create security concerns. In this section, we will look at policies at the national, federal as well as the regional (EU) level, taking into account that responsibilities lie with respective communities or states to define an integration strategy.

Integration policies in Europe have growingly become more targeted, to address specific needs and challenges of particular groups, including refugees, third country nationals arriving to Europe for work purposes, as well as other subgroups. The further refinement of integration policies, beyond the geographic and societal specificities of the contexts where migrants move, reflects an understanding of the varying needs, challenges, and potential threats that could arise from the lack of integration of

different groups. In addition, more efforts have been made to widen the integration process of prospective migrants to include countries of origin and transit as well as make use of novel technologies and social media to reach different migrant groups and provide reliable information on different topics.

The overarching policy on the integration of third country nationals in the European Union has developed in the last years in response to findings suggesting that third country citizens fare worse than their European counterparts in terms of employment, education and social inclusion (The Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2016). Although this is not necessarily seen as an emerging security threat, the lack of integration of third country nationals can provide a breeding ground for factors contributing to a range of threats from lack of social cohesion in communities to radicalisation or criminal activities. Although there seems to be no direct connection between lacking integration and radicalisation, the prior plays a role as a background factor. In addressing this aspect, integration policy can make its contribution to soften related links and to prevent the potential security threats from becoming the actual ones. In 2016, the EU developed an Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals. This was partially motivated by findings pointing to the fact that, despite the efforts made to integrate third-country nationals, third-country citizens face barriers in the education system, in the labour market and in accessing housing, which puts them at risk of poverty and social exclusion, even in cases where they are in employment (The Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2016).

To overcome these shortcomings, the EU promoted more targeted integration policies, taking into consideration individual characteristics. Among the measures aimed at improving integration outcomes: pre-departure initiatives targeting refugees being resettled, or migrants joining their families in the EU or taking up jobs in Europe. Pre-departure language and job-targeted training significantly fast-track migrants' integration. The programs are jointly designed by countries of origin or transit and countries of destination, which has proven to be particularly efficient at accelerating integration.

The use of technology and social media has the potential to improve integration outcomes. Technologies, social media and the internet are useful tools to fulfil migrants' needs in terms of integration at different stages of the process, including prior to their departure. Some EU Member States have already developed online tools, such as mobile applications, to inform newly arrived asylum seekers about their rights, provide online basic language courses and practical information to facilitate access to different institutions and cater to different life needs. The EU also developed tools for coordination, funding and monitoring, including the monitoring of social inclusion and the active participation of third country nationals in society. In specific contexts, countries have followed an approach that aims at enforcing integration measures and imposing sanctions where migrants fail to reach particular integration targets.

In Belgium, for instance, while policies related to immigration and asylum are a federal competence, integration policy falls under the responsibility of the three different language communities. In 2016, the Belgian Government introduced a new law, which includes a new residence condition to the Immigration Act, stipulating that certain non-EU foreigners intending to reside in Belgium need to provide evidence of their willingness to integrate into Belgian society in order to keep their residence permit (Note de Politique Générale Asile et Migration Simplification Administrative, 2016). This entered into force in 2017. Since then, when applying for residence, non-EU foreigners are informed that their integration efforts will be controlled and reviewed at the first instance of renewal of their

residence permits. The individual has the responsibility to provide proof of her/his integration efforts and the state has the right to put an end to their right to reside in Belgium if they deem that the foreigner did not make reasonable efforts to integrate (Note de Politique Générale Asile et Migration Simplification Administrative, 2016).

A second part of the law aims to put in place a “newcomers’ declaration” aimed at all newly arriving non-EU migrants, who would need to sign a declaration indicating that they understand their rights and obligations as well as the values and liberties of the Belgian society and that they will act in accordance with them (La déclaration des primo-arrivants peut-être uniquement concrétisée en Flandre , 2017). This is part of the visa application/residence registration. The declaration includes general principles such as freedom of speech, sexual orientation, and gender equality, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. The declaration also includes a pledge to prevent and report any attempts to commit acts of terrorism. The requirement to sign such a declaration is an example of integration policies increasingly becoming an enforceable process, punishable by the withdrawal of the right to reside and work, rather than an optional interactive process that allows for the inclusion of different cultural norms. Integration becomes a necessity for all migrants residing and working in Belgium to maintain their status or face expulsion. This law has been heavily criticised by different parties, especially where the state defers the interpretation of integration standards to different language communities. The combination of the localised understanding of integration and the creation of obligations on migrants reflects a new understanding of policy measures as being both localised (as within the same country different obligations and understandings of integration apply in different language communities) and essential for social cohesion.

By contrast, the integration policy for asylum seekers and refugees in Germany follows an incentive-based approach, where proactive integration efforts are rewarded rather than the lack of such efforts being punished. Under the Act to Accelerate Asylum Procedures, asylum seekers who are more likely to settle in Germany have access to integration courses, job-related language support, promotion of employment and the temporary lift of the employment ban (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasperek, 2019). At the same time, the Act to Readjust the Right to Stay and Termination Residency introduced a new type of residency, which is independent of age, in the case of “suitable integration”. Suitable integration is mostly linked to a language test corresponding to the A2 European level.

In addition to measures aimed at incentivising migrants to integrate through directly linking residence status to integration outcomes, some states specifically targeted threats to integration, namely discrimination; social and political exclusion and different forms of hate speech. In the framework of the update of the Integrated Communities Action Plan, the UK Government also published an updated Hate Crime Action Plan, targeting anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim actions and supporting victims of these crimes (HM Government, 2019). The Government has also taken active steps in driving integration at the local level, piloted in five integration areas, with each Local Integration Partnership¹⁴ identifying its own local priorities and the most effective ways to address them (HM Government, 2019). The UK Government has also set up a Controlling Migration Fund of 26 million Pounds aimed at supporting local projects across England in places where the scope of recent migration has affected local services and communities. The projects supported through this fund tackle a wide range of

¹⁴ Under the Integration Area Programme, each of the five areas selected has a Local Integration Partnership bringing local partners together including businesses, social and faith sectors. By engaging and consulting local people, each Local Integration Partnership identifies local priorities for integration.

challenges including abusive property owners, migrant rough sleeping, and social integration and building stronger communities (HM Government, 2019). Similar initiatives were undertaken in Greece where the Government has created the National Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism for Political Inclusion and Social Cohesion, as well as the National Council Against Racism and Intolerance in order to develop and promote policies aimed at enhancing social inclusion and cohesion, and tackle racism and intolerance, in coordination with civil society organisations and other partners (Hellenic Ministry of Immigration Policy, 2019).

3.1.5 Return Policies

Examining return policies is particularly relevant to understanding governments' responses to irregular migration and the dynamics between countries of origin, transit and destination. Although, as highlighted in previous sections, irregular migration itself is considered a security threat as well as a symbolic one, other threats linked with the vulnerabilities faced by irregular migrants, such as exposure to exploitative informal economies and criminal networks, have been included as a rationale for improving return policies. Similarly to border control policies, return policies rely on cooperation between states, which will be further explored in this section, in the context of incentivised cooperation and readmission agreements.

Return subscribes to measures aiming, among others, to address a host of threats, ranging from irregular migration to migrants' involvement in criminal activities. Forced-return decisions are the implementation of laws according to which illegally residing individuals who have no legal grounds to be accepted should be expelled. Increasingly, more countries have advocated for a repatriation of "undesirable" individuals, considered to pose a security threat to countries. In Belgium, the issue of incarcerated criminals with a residence status was addressed in the Policy Note from the State Secretary for Asylum and Migration for 2018-2019 (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018). The reform of the Law on Foreigners decreased the legal obstacles to withdrawing residence permits from convicted criminals. Under this new law, convicted foreign criminals face deportation at the end of their prison sentence. At the time of the publication of the Policy Note, 195 decisions of residence right termination were signed, in line with the new legislation. This entails that at the end of prison sentences, some migrants convicted for a crime will be deported to their countries of origin. The current administration underlined that they will make use of the new legislation – of "stripping criminals of residence rights status – as often as possible, for disrupting the public order" (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018). These measures applying to legal residents as well as to irregular migrants outline the weight put on the criminal involvement of migrants, regardless of the migration status.

Algeria has implemented return policies putting in place return procedures for individuals whose legal stay has expired and for those who would like to voluntarily return to their countries of origin. For the forced return, migrants are either taken towards the borders or forcibly removed. This is described as a procedure taken against migrants considered as "undesirable individuals" and whose presence represents a threat to the public order and security, as well as for those individuals who have entered and/or resided in Algeria illegally. Return policies are described as a symbol of state sovereignty over a territory, and are implemented in line with the law (Yousfat & Bentayebi, 2019).

In EU countries, voluntary return policies are also designed to encourage migrants to return to their countries of origin through financial incentives and reintegration programs for rejected asylum claimants as well as other migrants with no legal grounds for remaining in the country. Germany

implements several return programmes combined with reintegration, including short-term training and financial incentives provided through state and federal channels to migrants who are eligible for voluntary return schemes. Under the Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum Seekers in Germany and the Government Assisted Repatriation Programme, 54,006 departures took place in 2016 and another 29,587 in 2017. Information centres based in reception camps in Germany also provide advice on voluntary returns. This counselling is carried out by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which is the same institution in charge of evaluating asylum applications (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasparek, 2019). The provision of information on voluntary return pathways in reception centres and the provision of counselling on return by institutions in charge of asylum allow migrants to be exposed to information they would otherwise not have access to. The availability of these resources plays a role in influencing migrants' decision-making and their assessment of voluntary return as a viable option.

Similar to other policy areas, measures implemented under return policies can also be a tool to signal a government's position towards irregular migrants. In the State Strategy on Migration for Kosovo, for instance, the return policy is seen as an important and complementary tool to combating irregular migration and it is aimed at affecting irregular movements by "sending a clear message to potential migrants that respecting legal provisions is the only way to benefit from migration" (Republic of Kosovo, 2013).

3.1.6 Policies Addressing Trafficking in Human Beings

There are mainly two policy narratives that aim to explain and claim the issue of trafficking in human beings (THB). On the one side, there is the penal law approach. The UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol (the Palermo Protocol) introduced for the first time an international and general definition of trafficking. The Palermo Protocol is placed under the UN Convention against Organised Crime, whose main concern – organized crime – is by definition the object of activity of law enforcement authorities, charged with maintaining the order, and by extension the safety, of their jurisdictions. From this perspective, addressing trafficking in human beings subscribes to security approaches.

On the other side, trafficking is being claimed by the area of human rights, but also by other areas. Laczko & Danailova-Trainor (2009) acknowledge, for instance, that "the definition of human trafficking is operationalised from different perspectives based on the primary research area – for example, labour, migration, criminal justice – [...] with each area conceptualising trafficking within its own domain" (Danailova-Trainor & Laczko, 2009). It is worth mentioning that THB has been explained, even before the internationally accepted definition from the Palermo Protocol, as being linked with migration (Cyrus, 2015). While shortly after the Palermo Protocol the policy debates on THB, at least in the European context, concentrated on the characteristics and legal elements of trafficking as different from smuggling, in the years 2000s the focus shifted towards (extreme) exploitation. Another shift in anti-trafficking approaches has been from the main priority given to protecting persons that have been trafficked to a priority given, at least in the EU context, to prevention of trafficking. The entire approach of addressing demand in the context of trafficking – based on Article 18 of Directive 2011/36/EU – subscribes to this shift.

One of the established approaches to address trafficking has been the adoption and implementation of anti-trafficking legislation at the national level. The first difference within this approach, between the EU Member States and non-EU countries considered in this report, is that the EU MSs are bound by the European Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims. All current and former EU MSs included in this report (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,

Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) put in place anti-trafficking legislation, which transposes, to various degrees, the EU Anti-Trafficking Directive¹⁵.

Under the section on trafficking in the context of migration, the second report from the European Commission on the progress made in the fight against THB notes that “Member States report on victims of trafficking found in asylum application systems and on organised criminal groups abusing asylum procedures” (Second Report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (2018), 2018). Member States also report traffickers requiring victims to apply for international protection in an attempt to regularise the victims’ status”¹⁶.

From the non-EU members under research, Kosovo’s Strategy on Migration outlines a holistic approach to tackling different aspects of human trafficking by strengthening its measures aimed at preventing all forms of trafficking and re-trafficking, investigating and sentencing traffickers, implementing anti-corruption measures for police officers, prosecutors, judges and other officials involved. The approach also mentions conducting investigations in the framework of cooperation in the areas of data collection and analysis from the police as well as other institutions (Republic of Kosovo, 2013). Anti-trafficking legislation is also in place in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. Under Algerian Law, human trafficking is criminalised and punishable of 3 to 5 years of imprisonment, and a fine ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 Algerian dinars (equivalent to 2,200 to 3,700 EUR) (Yousfat & Bentayebi, 2019). This crime has recently been classified as a felony in some cases, and punishments have been toughened to reach up to ten years of imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 Algerian dinars.

In Egypt, Law 64 of 2010 on combating THB “portrays migrants as victims and criminalises those who are complicit “in the trade in people” and for the purpose of exploitation. The Law foresees prison sentences for up to 15 years or in some cases a life sentence, and a fine between 50000 and 200.000 Egyptian pounds or the amount of the profit of the crime, whichever is greater” (Al-Kashef & Martin, 2019). From the three North-African countries under research, Tunisia – a non-member state of the Council of Europe – was invited in 2018 to sign the CoE Convention against THB (invitation valid until February 2023) (Non-member States of the Council of Europe Five years validity of an invitation to sign and ratify or to accede to the Council of Europe’s treaties , 2020). According to a report published by the Institute for Security Studies¹⁷, “the 2016 Tunisian law lays out robust sanctions, ranging from 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment” (Dhaouadi, 2020).

¹⁵ For an analysis on the transposition of the Directive 2011/36/EU see the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the extent to which Member States have taken the necessary measures in order to comply with the Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims in accordance with Article 23(1), available: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/report_on_member_states_compliance_with_directive_2011-36_en.pdf

¹⁶ In the same document, the Commission states “trafficking in human beings should be addressed in the context of migration taking into account new patterns such as disproportionate targeting of women and girls trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Efforts should continue to ensure that all victims are identified and provided with assistance and protection appropriate to their gender, age and the form of exploitation” (p.5).

¹⁷ “The ISS is an African non-profit organisation with offices in South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal. Their work covers transnational crimes, migration, maritime security and development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, crime prevention and criminal justice, and the analysis of conflict and governance” (<https://issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work>).

For the purpose of this report, in addition to the national anti-trafficking legislation¹⁸, we will refer to measures aimed at addressing the demand for goods or services provided through exploitation or trafficking in human beings. Measures implemented to address demand depend on the institutional system in place in a country, as well as the prevalent types of trafficking addressed through those measures.

According to the 2016 GRETA report on the compliance of Kosovo with the standards of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, “since 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has organised every year in September and October an awareness-raising campaign against human trafficking under the slogan ‘Open your eyes’” (Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 2015). Information campaigns aimed at informing the general public, as well as targeted groups, including children and their parents, about the dangers of trafficking, including labour exploitation, forced begging and sexual exploitation were also conducted.

In January 2019, the Algerian Ministry of Solidarity, Family Affairs, and Status of Women initiated an awareness campaign to stop the use of children in begging networks. The government continued to operate three hotlines, which were operational 24 hours a day, and a public website to report abuse and other crimes, including potential human trafficking crimes (US Embassy, 2019).

In Egypt, the National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM) – in charge with coordinating the anti-trafficking national policy – “distributed anti-trafficking informational booklets to migrant workers and all Egyptian embassies and diplomats abroad. NCCPIM and the National Council of Women conducted a media campaign about the treatment of domestic workers, a group vulnerable to trafficking. Another worth noting approach is a microfinance system, programs for the empowerment of women workers, literacy and elimination of slums and has prepared awareness programs on the dangers and forms of human trafficking in addition to targeting the phenomenon of illegal migration (Mohamed Rashad, 2019):

In Tunisia, demand for forced labour is addressed through a series of measures. “The labour inspectorate designated 25 labour inspectors and 24 social workers trained as specialized points of contact for child trafficking victims. To address fraudulent labour recruitment practices, the Agency for Placement Abroad in Private Establishments (EPPA), a governmental agency, filed complaints with the MOI against 17 private employers for cases of fraud, extortion, or unauthorized abuses of Tunisians employed abroad; it also took action against 30 private employers who recruited workers without proper registration with the EPPA. [...] In July 2017, the government signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO and the largest Tunisian labour and employers' unions to promote decent work in Tunisia for 2017-2022” (United States Department of State, 2018).

To sum up, countries under research have in place various measures to address trafficking in human beings – from penal legislation and capacity building to financial incentives and information campaigns – measures which depend on the characteristics of trafficking addressed, the institutional setting addressing trafficking as well as the groups considered vulnerable to trafficking.

3.2 Security Policies

Security policies, both in the public and private sphere, are not particularly addressing migration, but rather affect populations within a territory. Although some migration policies clearly overlap with

¹⁸ Criminology studies argue that penal legislation, in addition to correction and removing the danger from society, have a preventive effect (Source). However, such detailed legal analysis falls beyond the scope of this report.

different aspects of public security, such as border management, these policies affect predominantly migrants and have therefore been included in the previous chapter. In this chapter, the focus lies on security policies linked with migration, by disproportionately affecting migrant groups more than other groups, or through making provisions targeting specifically migrants, such as criminality among migrant groups.

3.2.1 Policies Addressing Criminality among Migrants

Addressing criminality among migrants, particularly irregular migrants, has been a priority for many governments. Where the threat to public security and illicit economic activities conducted by migrants are explicit, European states have put in place different types of measures to address these threats, sometimes indiscriminate of the severity of the criminal act.

One of the most recent policy notes issued by the Belgian Government also addressed petty crime among migrants, and more specifically incidents of shoplifting or pickpocketing committed by migrants (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018). For these types of offenders, measures to quickly deport them are rather limited, but remain a priority for the Government. The “Gaudi” initiatives targeting “thieves” residing irregularly in Belgium involve large scale raids and tend to be particularly efficient with the coordination of local and federal police on one side and the Office for Foreigners on the other. These types of operations, piloted since 2014, have led to the arrest of 1,347 individuals in an irregular situation, with some being transferred to closed detention centres and a few ending up in prisons. These migrants are usually deported at the end of their sentence (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018).

A similar approach targeting migrants with a criminal background was implemented by the UK, which will be revised following Brexit, to submit all migrants, including EU citizens to the same measures as third country nationals. Under the new UK Immigration System, the UK Immigration Rules regarding the refusal of entry, permission to remain and deportation will apply to all individuals entering the UK, including EU citizens. This is seen as enhancing the UK’s ability to refuse entry or remove EU citizens seen as threats to the country based on their conduct or previous criminality. These measures are meant to introduce consistency when dealing with potential threats and preventing any dangerous individuals from crossing the border (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2018).

Currently, under the existing EU rules, a person must represent “a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat before he or she can be deported”. The EU rules also do not specify what types of behaviour can result in the refusal of entry, exclusion or deportation of an EU citizen from the UK, as well as the length of imprisonment. By contrast, the current UK rules that non-EU citizens are subjected to are stricter and more specific. To improve the safety and security of the UK, following the implementation period, the UK Government intends to extend the application of the non-EU criminality criteria to EU citizens both when crossing the borders as well as when residing in the UK. The same extension of rules will apply to deportation in regards to criminal acts committed in the UK.

In addition, intelligence led enforcement of immigration laws and rules aims to tackle activities of organized crime groups, fraud and deception such as the case of Operation Boromo¹⁹, links to wider criminality as well as offences against migrants. Between April and December 2018, the Home Office

¹⁹ Refers to a crime group arranging sham marriages and committing tax, benefit and travel ticket fraud.

Immigration Enforcement teams reported to have disrupted and dismantled 185 organised immigration crime groups.

3.2.2 Policies Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation

Several terrorist attacks perpetrated by migrants or individuals from a migration background took place in European countries after 2015 (Bensman, 2019). Although the link between these incidents and the more recent migration influxes has yet to be established, public debates around the relationship between migration and terrorist threats have intensified. Countries under study, both European and non-European have experienced this phenomenon to varying degrees. Looking at measures addressing violent extremism and radicalisation provides an overview of the different types of responses from governments, aimed at tackling violent extremism and preventing radicalisation. According to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, newly arrived migrants, as well as European citizens of migrant origin and Diasporas, are particularly vulnerable individuals, subjected to discrimination and marginalisation in their host societies, which increases their vulnerability to extremist propaganda (Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2018). Another factor contributing to the recruitment of vulnerable migrants includes the rise of social media and the internet as a platform facilitating the radicalisation process. Recruiters have been known to use social media to personally target individuals online and communicate with them, given the convenience and the relative privacy of such medium (Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2018).

According to a parliamentary report by the Council of Europe, many migrants reach Europe with a set of "misconceptions" spread through smugglers detailing unrealistic and spectacular pictures of European cities via social media, often used in advertisements to target prospective migrants. Some recruiters use the opportunity of smuggling migrants to preach amongst refugees in refugee camps and mosques. According to a counter-extremist organisation, these recruiters tap into the frustrations created by lengthy asylum procedures and sometimes an ineffective asylum system to provoke hatred towards the "West and Western values" and setting them to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Europeans (Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2018).

The report also details a typology of migrants who are more vulnerable to such narratives or similar ones: Young people between 16 and 24 years old with a history of poor school performance, possibly a criminal record ranging from petty crimes to more serious offenses, without work experience and often characterised as "second generation migrants"²⁰. Other radicalisation factors include prisons and detention centres, which were described as "massive incubators for radicalisation", economic and social exclusion of migrants, lack of resources in reception facilities for migrants, described as "organised in a chaotic way with minimal to no resources", as well as the discrimination and segregation of migrants in European societies.

To counter these threats, several European countries have put in place mechanisms to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. In Belgium, working groups were created within different government institutions. They specialise in particular trends or issues, including radicalisation online, on the radio, television, as well as right- and left-wing extremism, including Salafism²¹. This approach is complementary to other ad-hoc working groups who

²⁰ This term is misleading since they are not migrants but rather born to migrant parents.

²¹ Refers to an understanding and interpretation of Islam advocating for a return to religion according to older and traditional practices and a more literal interpretation of religious texts.

target what is referred to as “problematic radicalisation” which include groups focusing on “hate preachers”, “mosques”, “asylum and migration” (Note de Politique Générale Asile et Migration Simplification Administrative, 2015).

Similar to many countries facing hate preachers in mosques, Belgium introduced a set of reforms to combat hate preachers and ensure hate speech does not occur in places of worship. An additional control is also planned for visa applicants by imams from outside the EU. The visa assessment is no longer conducted solely by the national security but also involves the General Service for Intelligence and Security. The 2017 Policy Note highlights that only imams officially recognised and working in official mosques will be eligible for a visa (Note de Politique Générale Asile et Migration Simplification Administrative, 2016). In addition, under the Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation Processes that Can Lead to Extremism and Terrorism, the Flemish Minister for Local and Provincial Government emphasises the importance of consulting with representatives of “philosophies of life” to facilitate interfaith dialogue as well as develop social orientation and training sessions of Dutch as a second language, tailored for imams. This project is piloted by the Agency for Integration and Civic Integration and is developed to be included within an existing imam training. The Ministry of Integration also aims at facilitating the training and professionalization of imams through the creation of educational and professional opportunities in collaboration with KU Leuven and the Antwerp University Association (AUHA) (Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation Processes that Can Lead to Extremism and Terrorism, 2015). While some might see these measures as interference of the state in religious affairs, these interventions are not unique to Belgium and provide a new understanding of the state and religious affairs dynamics under the “securitization of migration”.

These challenges are evidently not unique to EU countries. Kosovo reports that among the pull factors mentioned in the context of violent radicalisation, the influence of radical leaders, including imams with radical tendencies, has played a central role in the recruitment of foreign fighters, as well as online radicalism with the rise of social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other networks (Republic of Kosovo-Office of the Prime Minister, 2015).

To counter these threats, the Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism mentions four strategic objectives ranging from early detection, prevention, intervention to de-radicalisation and reintegration. In addition, a commission was established to review the religious content broadcasted on the internet, as well as ensuring the translation of moderate religious content online in Albanian, coordinated by religious communities, government officials as well as field experts who are tasked to analyse existing religious content online (Republic of Kosovo-Office of the Prime Minister, 2015). The creation of translated moderate counter-narratives online represents a reactive intervention to online radicalisation that can serve as an example of more broadly countering false narratives leading to security threats.

3.3 Technology, Social Media and Information Policies

3.3.1 ICT Policies

The creation of joint databases between different institutions and ministries has been a key measure for utilising technology to counter threats in relation to migrants’ criminal backgrounds, and to establish whether individuals represent a threat to public security. Measures involving a unified database were implemented in countries like Germany or Belgium, and have had a significantly positive impact in bridging the gap and identifying potentially dangerous individuals.

In Belgium, an agreement between the Federal Police and the Office for Foreigners was put in place, followed by the technical development of a National General Database (BNG)²². The Federal Police has access to and is able to consult the Database. As a result, the Office for Foreigners is able to verify if a foreigner committed actions affecting the public order and taking that into consideration when making an administrative decision. Prior to this procedure, the decision of the Office of Foreigners depended on the direct transfer of information by the police. As of 2018, the Office for Foreigners had direct access to the National General Database (BNG) (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018). In total, 12,500 consultations were made by the Office for Foreigners during 2017, of which 3,129 yielded a positive result. In other terms, one out of four foreigners for which the Office made a background check through the database was known by the police authorities. These background findings were also taken into account when making and justifying a decision, as well as determining the duration of an entry ban (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018).

Similarly, in Germany the Act to Improve the Exchange of Data was introduced in February 2016 to improve the existing data in the Central Register of Foreign Nationals (AZR) (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasperek, 2019). The new database created includes, in addition to information on foreigners' visas residing in Germany, the data of asylum and protection seekers. The information contains basic personal and identification information. The Act also stipulated mandatory security checks on asylum seekers and the obligation to transmit data to the Central Register of Foreign Nationals for all authorities, conditional on the fact that they are authorised to do so. Prior to February 2016, the Central Register of Foreign Nationals was operated by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in cooperation with the Federal Office of Administration and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), mainly for the use of civil servants in the Foreigners' Offices across Germany. As of 2016, access was granted also to police and customs authorities.

3.3.2 Information Policies

Information campaigns have been instrumental in “rectifying” narratives of life in Europe and providing counter-narratives to prospective migrants undertaking dangerous journeys to reach Europe. Information campaigns have also been utilised to address other challenges, such as ensuring the integration of newly arrived migrants, understanding asylum rights and procedures (for asylum seekers from safe countries of origin) and creating awareness with regard to vulnerable groups.

In order to manage new migrants' expectations and prepare them for life in the UK, in the framework of the Integrated Communities Action Plan launched in February 2019, the Government provides information for all visa application routes about what life in modern Britain is like (HM Government, 2019). The main goal of this activity is to inform individuals about the British values before they arrive in the UK (HM Government, 2019). The Integration Area Programme offers a package of practical information to newly arrived migrants to support their access and use of local services, as well as their effort to build social connections within their new communities.

Information campaigns have also been used, through social media platforms, to deter migrants and asylum seekers from reaching specific countries. In Belgium, the Government emphasised that dissuasion campaigns will be intensified and multiplied to convince potential victims of human trafficking not to go to Belgium. Social media platforms were used to inform specific nationalities,

²² Banque de Données Nationale Générale

through targeted messages about the strict measures taken by the Belgian Government. This was part of a larger campaign aimed at tackling secondary movements among migrants in transit. The campaign also aimed at better informing migrants in transit about asylum procedures and the possible venues of asylum applications.

The Office of Foreigners initiated an action plan and developed Facebook ads to dissuade migrants from undertaking the journey to Belgium. The specific features of Facebook allowed these ads to reach specific audiences. Some advertisements have been communicated in six different languages (Arabic, Urdu, Kurdish, English, Hindi, and Pashto) in different locations in Belgium and Europe (Parc Maximilien, Zeebruges, highway parkings, as well as “hotspots” in Greece and Italy, Northern France, Spanish “enclaves”, asylum centres in Germany etc.). According to the report, these ads were consulted 776,538 times already (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018).

In Germany, several initiatives on providing alternative views to how life in Europe is portrayed were implemented. The Federal Network African Diaspora of Germany, the Federal Foreign Service, as well as six of the top ten African countries of origin for migrants in Germany launched “Lost Dreams”, a film project aimed to raise awareness and prevent loss of migrants’ lives and the exposure to dangers encountered on the way to Europe (“Lost Dreams” - Aufklärung für afrikanische Flüchtlinge, 2019). The film project highlights the types of dangers migrants might encounter along the different smuggling routes across the Mediterranean and aims to correct inaccurate information about Europe and Germany spread by smugglers to lure and convince migrants to undertake the dangerous journeys. The film project tries to correct the “utopian image” spread about Germany as the land in which “milk and honey flow and money grows on trees” and is translated into German, French, English, Somali, and Hausa. This project aims at targeting potential migrants in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Cameroon and DRC and is expected to have reached at least 15 million African viewers. The “Lost Dreams” project is based on real life experiences and features interviews with refugees from African countries who have taken the journey to Europe through the Mediterranean routes. Migrants are asked about false rumours circulated across Germany. Some celebrities of African descent living in Germany also feature in these films with the aim of sending a message to African youth and warn them about the dangers of illegally crossing the Mediterranean. Alternative legal ways of entering Germany are presented in these films. Newly arrived refugees are interviewed in cooperation with partners in Italy and Spain along the coasts (“Lost Dreams” - Aufklärung für afrikanische Flüchtlinge, 2019).

3.4 Selected Types of Policy Measures – Discussion

This section outlines the main arguments of selected policy measures identified in countries under study as addressing threats that are linked with perceptions. The types of policies collected are rather snapshots of policy measures’ mechanisms. While these measures operate within mutable contexts, a discussion on the relevance of such contexts, although necessary for a full policy analysis as well as an impact evaluation, falls beyond the scope of this report. As mentioned in the first chapter, this report is a starting point and a basis for the upcoming fieldwork in countries under research, in the framework of the H2020 PERCEPTIONS project. The upcoming fieldwork will focus, among others, on how policy makers and first-line practitioners understand the role of “perceptions of destination areas” in the decision-making process of migrants, including prospective migrants.

As outlined in the chapter of working concepts of this report, the rising securitization of migration, particularly in Europe but also in some non-EU countries included in this research, has shaped the common understanding of what and who represents a potential threat, as well as a more defensive

and strict approach informing the policymaking in a number of EU and non-EU countries. The securitisation of migration has been a growing trend over the last decade, often described as a process of “repositioning areas of regular politics into the realm of security by increasingly using narratives of threat and danger aimed at justifying the adoption of extraordinary measures” (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). Under the securitisation framework, measures, policies or operations that were once perceived as extreme, unjustified and inhumane become normalised. Looking at different areas of migration policies, ranging from asylum, settlement, integration and return, it becomes clear that the securitisation approach applies to different stages of the migration journey.

3.4.1 Policy Measures in the Area of Asylum

In the area of asylum policies, a large influx of migrants has been framed (by policymakers) as a threat to countries’ stability and capacity to host asylum seekers. One manifestation of this threat has been detected as “abusive” practices, such as lodging multiple asylum claims, which take up state resources and are aimed at prolonging the “abusive” asylum claimants’ residence in the country (while these multiple claims are being processed). To counter this threat, several countries (such as Belgium and Germany) introduced measures aimed at speeding the process of dealing with asylum claims and reducing the costs of case processing. These changes in procedures, while aimed to protect the asylum system (and its resources) from a high number of claims, including what are considered to be “false” claims, aim, by extension, to also deter potential asylum seekers. This is exemplified through additional measures in Germany, when the 2015 Act to Accelerate Asylum Procedures was introduced. The Act aimed at reducing the incentive of unjustified applications by replacing cash benefits with in-kind benefits during the initial reception phase, reducing the benefits for those who have to leave the country, and excluding asylum seekers from safe countries of origin from the labour market. In the typology of regulatory mechanisms introduced earlier in this report, these types of measures subscribe to command and control – changes in legislations – coupled with market-based approaches – financial disincentives – and aim at changing prospective asylum seekers’ behaviour through altering the migration infrastructure as a precipitating factor in the country of destination (see Van Hear, Bakewell and Long, 2017²³). Another example of such mechanism, aimed at changing migration infrastructures, is the hotspot approach introduced by the European Commission to support frontline member states, like Greece, in order to alleviate the pressure and provide operational assistance to identify, register, fingerprint, and debrief newly arriving migrants and asylum seekers, as well as support return operations.

The approach followed in Tunisia, and a number of other North African countries, where asylum seekers (arriving irregularly) are treated as offenders – and are kept in detention – is another example of command and control. The message in this particular case is straightforward – those who do not comply with the law (and enter or stay in the country illegally) are sanctioned. Furthermore, those in detention are not able to reach the UNHCR in order to submit their asylum claims, which is a strong disincentive for prospective asylum seekers.

²³ Push-pull: reconsidering the drivers of migration

3.4.2 Measures Addressing Irregular Migration

Irregular migration is regarded, from the perspective of a state, as a security threat to the territory of the country and to its sovereignty. States' policy responses to irregular migration can be categorised in gatekeeping and fencing policies, along two dimensions – external (from the perspective of entering the country) and internal (with regard to the residency in the country) (Vogel, 2016). Gatekeeping measures have the goal to check the eligibility to access the territory or other rights that come with accessing a territory. From a gatekeeping perspective, measures on the external dimension are visa procedures and border controls at ports of entry, while measures on the internal dimension manifest as procedures to prevent access to legal status, labour market or welfare support. Fencing approaches have the aim to stop irregular migration from occurring. On the external dimension, fencing approaches are border controls outside ports of entry, while within the territory fencing manifests as police and labour market inspections.

Examples of measures presented in this report are various combinations of fencing and gatekeeping approaches. It is worth mentioning also that policymakers' response varies amongst countries of origin, transit and destination. Countries of origin and transit, such as Tunisia or Algeria, follow what was called a "crimmigration approach" – criminalizing irregular migrants, including asylum seekers. This particular approach, a command and control type of approach, falls under the internal dimension of gatekeeping measures. European countries with an external EU border, such as Bulgaria, Italy and Greece, have strengthened their fencing policies, increased border capacities in coordination with Frontex, and promoted information campaigns deterring migrants from undertaking dangerous journeys to reach Europe. These measures, aiming at preventing irregular migration, address the external dimension of fencing policies. From the perspective of regulatory mechanisms, these measures (in countries at the EU external border) are combinations of command and control and market-based approaches²⁴, particularly if they involve information campaigns that offer alternatives to irregular migration.

Information campaigns have been implemented in various policy areas, including policies addressing irregular migration. The declared goal of the 2016 "Aware Migrants"²⁵ campaign was to reduce the number of deaths in the Mediterranean. According to its intervention logic, this campaign aims at reaching its goal through increasing awareness among prospective migrants with regard to the dangers of an irregular journey to Europe. Among the messages communicated in the framework of this campaign are messages from migrants who reached Italy. They describe the risks they faced, the stories of their losses and the violence they suffered along the journey, as well as the disillusionment of their expectations once they reached Europe. The transmission of such messages constitutes perhaps the most straightforward example of a policy measure aiming to address perceptions of migrants. One of the underlying assumptions of such information campaigns, aiming to discourage irregular migration (through messages on the danger of the journey) is that (potential) migrants held beliefs, which stand in contrast to knowledge²⁶ (Pritchard, 2018). The underlying argument of these

²⁴ See further below in this chapter a discussion on information campaigns, subscribing to these approaches.

²⁵ <https://awaremigrants.org/>

²⁶ For the purpose of this analysis, knowledge here is understood as propositional knowledge – which refers to gathering (accurate) information about the world or about a specific situation (in this particular case, accurate information about the journey to Europe or to a particular country). Information and communication

campaigns is that “what is presented to [potential migrants] in perceptual experience [e.g. images of Europe posted on social media platforms by smugglers to advertise their smuggling services] is not the world itself but merely an expression of the world from which [migrants] draw inferences about how the world [...] is” (Pritchard, 2018). Previous analyses of the intervention logic of information campaigns underlined the fact that “raising awareness is not sufficient if the campaign ultimately seeks to change behaviour” (Cyrus & Vogel, Learning from Demand-Side Campaigns against Trafficking in Human Beings: Evaluation as Knowledge-Generator and Project Improver, 2017). In addition to information about the dangers of an irregular journey to Europe, “Aware Migrants” provides information on alternatives, such as websites for finding legal employment either in African countries (such as Tunisia) or in European countries (particularly Germany). While this has the potential to change behaviour – in that prospective migrants choose these legal pathways instead of embarking on an irregular journey to Europe – the lack of information (available for the purpose of this report) on the causal link between the information campaign and the reduction of irregular departures makes it difficult to write of its impacts²⁷.

3.4.3 Measures in the Area of Border Control

With regard to border control, measures employed overlap, to a certain extent, with measures subscribing to fencing approaches aimed at stopping irregular migration. Threats and challenges addressed through measures subscribing to border management comprise migrant smuggling, movements within the EU of regularly residing migrants and who have a criminal background, as well as the limited capacities and resources of third countries in border management. One measure employed was to change the regulations for border crossing. Germany, like other several Schengen countries, re-introduced border checks in the Schengen area, invoking the “exceptional circumstances” of the 2015 migration policy crisis. Such measures aimed at stopping migrants from entering the country and, in case of transit countries, determined migrants to choose alternative routes.

Border management, particularly through what was called externalisation of border control, is implemented through cooperation between countries’ homologue institutions. Along this line, Germany introduced various measures, including the provision of resources to specific third countries, amongst which are Tunisia and Egypt. This support includes police capacity-building and training, assistance in security sector reforms and counterterrorism, among others (Hänsel, Hess, & Kasperek, 2019). Agreements between the EU and third countries (such as the Association Agreement with the EU signed with Egypt in 2017) have been instrumental in strengthening third countries capacities at managing their borders but have also impacted migrants and smuggling networks behaviours. The introduction of new identification and travel documents, and the guarding of new crossing points, in combination with stricter sentences for those who do not comply, have aimed at deterring migrants through a command and control approach.

technologies contribute to what has been labelled as “the problem of perceptual knowledge”, since “the way things look isn’t always the way things are; appearances can be deceptive” (Pritchard, 2010: 69).

²⁷ An analysis of the impact of measures falls outside the scope of this report. In the framework of the PERCEPTIONS project, a separate report on “good practices” in addressing threats that are linked with perceptions is being compiled. Together – information on policy measures mechanisms, threats that are linked with perceptions and good practices in addressing these threats – form the basis for the upcoming field work in the framework of PERCEPTIONS.

3.4.4 Migration Integration Measures

Anecdotal evidence has shown that integration policies contribute to the creation of perceptions of countries of destination from prospective migrants' perspectives. The overarching approach on the integration of third country nationals in the European Union has developed in the last years in response to findings suggesting that third country citizens fare worse than their European counterparts in terms of employment, education and social inclusion (The Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2016). Although this is not necessarily seen as an immediate security threat, the lack of integration of third country nationals can provide a breeding ground for a range of threats from lack of social cohesion in communities to radicalisation and criminal activities. Two approaches are relevant, from the perspective of mechanisms employed. In 2016, the Belgian Government introduced a new law, which includes a new residence condition to the Immigration Act, stipulating that certain non-EU foreigners intending to reside in Belgium need to provide evidence of their willingness to integrate into Belgian society, in order to keep their residence permit (Note de Politique Générale Asile et Migration Simplification Administrative, 2016). From this perspective, it is the migrant's responsibility to prove integration efforts and the regional administration can decide whether or not the migrant made reasonable efforts to integrate. In Germany, the integration policy for asylum seekers and refugees follows an incentive-based approach, where integration efforts are rewarded rather than the lack of such efforts being punished. These two approaches, while they both subscribe to command and control (being implemented through legal changes and the respective penalties) employ different mechanisms for changing behaviour. The German approach would also subscribe, to a certain extent, to market-based approaches, as services offered to migrants legally residing in the country are being transformed into incentives for integration efforts.

3.4.5 Return Measures

Return decisions are measures to counter various threats, ranging from irregular migration to migrants' involvement in criminal activities. In Belgium, for instance, convicted migrant criminals (even if legally residing in Belgium) face deportation at the end of their sentence. This measure, different than the criminal justice applied in the case of Belgian citizens, implies that migrants with a criminal record continue to be regarded as a threat – “disrupting the public order” – even after they serve their time (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2018). Subscribing to the command and control type of measure, this measure implies that, particularly in case of migrants, law enforcement approaches cannot have a correction and re-education effect. Through this measure, it also signals that criminal behaviour among migrants will be more strongly sanctioned than in case of EU citizens. In EU countries, voluntary return policies are also designed to incentivise migrants to return to their countries of origin through financial incentives and reintegration programs for asylum seekers and other migrants. Germany has several programmes combined with reintegration schemes providing short term training and financial incentives.

3.4.6 Measures Addressing Trafficking in Human Beings

Traditionally, trafficking in human beings is being addressed through anti-trafficking legislation. All countries referred to in this report have a legal provision in this sense. From the types of mechanisms employed in this policy area, it is worth mentioning – in addition to command and control – some examples of combined approaches aimed at addressing demand for goods or services that are produced or offered through exploitation or trafficking in human beings. This is the case of campaigns aimed at informing vulnerable groups about the dangers of illegal employment (such as a campaign in

Egypt), but also sanctions applied to employers who engage in exploitative practices (such as the measures implemented in Tunisia).

Previous research on information campaigns aimed at reducing trafficking in human beings underlines the importance of this type of approach in anti-trafficking policies (Cyrus & Vogel, Learning from Demand-Side Campaigns against Trafficking in Human Beings: Evaluation as Knowledge-Generator and Project Improver, 2017). An analysis of the intervention logic of demand-side campaigns²⁸, particularly campaigns that address people as consumers who knowingly or unknowingly pay for the work or services of trafficked persons and campaigns that address the general public (who are expected to observe potential exploitative situations), showed that, in order to reach their intended goal, a long chain of effects has to be implemented in an uninterrupted way. “An interruption of the chain at any point means that the campaign has no impact on trafficking via the behaviour of the target group. Defects at any stage will water down the final impact on trafficking in human beings” (Cyrus & Vogel, Learning from Demand-Side Campaigns against Trafficking in Human Beings: Evaluation as Knowledge-Generator and Project Improver, 2017). When it comes to information campaigns targeting the general public, such as the campaigns run in Kosovo for informing the public about the dangers of various types of trafficking, the aim is to change the public’s perception about the prevalence of exploitation in various areas (such as begging). As in the case of campaigns aiming to reduce irregular migration, perceptions (in the sense of ideas and information about a topic) are being addressed as an intermediary step. The intervention logic of such campaigns includes an assumed link between perceptions and actual behaviour, in the sense that campaigns assume that a change in perceptions will eventually lead to changes in behaviour.

²⁸ Demand-side campaigns are aimed at reducing the demand for goods or services produced through exploitation or trafficking in human beings. The mentioned analysis looks at campaigns that address people as consumers who knowingly or unknowingly pay for the work or services of trafficked persons and campaigns that address the general public (who are expected to observe potential exploitative situations and report it to a hotline).

4 Conclusion

The “securitization of migration”, understood as increasingly framing migration policies in the realm of security, has significantly expanded over the last five years. Narratives of threats and security risks have justified measures, policies, and laws that were once considered to be “extreme”. This report has shown that threats, as understood by states, are not only understood as public, but also as security threats to individuals. Several institutions referred to economic threats resulting from a “disproportionate” number of asylum seekers arriving in countries of transit and destination, or migrants engaging in informal economic activities. Other threats, for example, symbolic threats to a country’s sovereignty by undermining its borders or abusing its policies have also been highlighted.

The policy measures introduced to counter these threats reflect an approach that not only aims at addressing particular challenges but also the behaviour, and sometimes environment, that gives rise to these challenges. Policies on addressing radicalisation online or the spread of disinformation on social media platforms signals states’ varying levels of intervention. However, what many of these policies had in common is a command and control approach, which manifests through the increasing involvement of law enforcement authorities at different stages of migration phases, the emphasis put on the collection and sharing of information on migrants across institutions and states, and the stricter methods used to enforce compliance, both in relation to neighbouring states as well as individuals. Governments have actively used incentives and disincentives to motivate migrants to integrate, comply, and make decisions on their return or asylum applications. Similar approaches have also been used by EU governments in cooperation with countries of transit and origin, particularly regarding policies on return and border management, both of which require collaboration between these countries in order to address, for instance, irregular migration.

Looking at policy measures addressing a range of threats through the migration behaviour they intend to change serves as a foundation for understanding to what extent perceptions held by migrants are relevant for such policy measures.

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